A/HRC/44/24 constituted an extreme and disproportionate measure that could not be justified in any circumstance. The Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and his peers from regional organizations, also stated that shutting down entire parts of communications systems can never be justified under human rights law. 49 He asked States and other actors to refrain from imposing Internet or telecommunications network disruptions and shutdowns. 50 Likewise, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression of the Organization of American States noted that cuts in Internet service and blanket Internet shutdowns were likely to contravene freedom of expression, unduly restricting the right to receive and impart information and to assemble online.51 23. While it is primarily the duty of States to avoid resorting to shutdowns, private companies also have a responsibility in this regard. Requests from States to switch off communications are implemented by providers that operate networks or facilitate network traffic. These providers could play a role in challenging Internet shutdown requests from governments and keep their customers informed of developments. 52 It is also critical that private companies ensure the greatest possible transparency in their actions when they implicate the freedom of peaceful assembly and other fundamental rights,53 including through reporting government requests for shutdowns and the implementation of any disruption orders. V. New technologies and the surveilling of protesters 24. Safe and confidential communications play a key role in the planning and holding of peaceful protests.54 Technology-enabled surveillance poses significant risks to the enjoyment of human rights in peaceful assemblies and is an important contributor to the shrinking of civic space in many countries. New technologies have significantly expanded the abilities of State authorities to surveil protests, protest organizers and participants. These technologies are used to monitor the planning and organization of protests – for example, through the hacking of the digital tools used by those seeking to assemble. They are also used to conduct surveillance during protests – for example, through the use of biometrics-based facial recognition technology and the interception of communications. In response to this trend, the Human Rights Council has underlined the importance of privacy online for the realization of the rights of peaceful assembly and association. It has also emphasized that technical solutions to secure and to protect the confidentiality of digital communications, including measures for encryption and anonymity, can be important to ensure the enjoyment of these rights. 55 In his report on the right to privacy in the digital age, the High Commissioner outlined key safeguards that States should implement for surveillance measures. 56 National legal frameworks, based on the principles of necessity and proportionality, are needed to regulate the use of surveillance tools.57 25. Similarly, the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression has called for strict limitations on restrictions to encryption and anonymity in order to ensure compliance with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality and legitimacy.58 Such restrictions are often used by law enforcement and intelligence agencies as quick reactions to terrorism, while failing to meet imperatives of necessity and proportionality, and 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 www.osce.org/fom/154846. www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/425282. Contribution of the Special Rapporteur on the freedom of expression of the Organization of American States. Contribution of Al Sur. A/HRC/32/38, para. 89. Contribution of Privacy International; A/HRC/31/66, para. 75. Human Rights Council resolutions 34/7 and 38/7. A/HRC/39/29. Contribution of Al Sur. A/HRC/29/32, para. 56. 7