A/HRC/29/51 The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, for example, first reported coalition-inflicted civilian casualties in November 2014.111 57. There remains a significant absence of transparency with regard to coalition operations in both Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic. Each nation participating in the air war operates under unique rules of engagement, and transparency levels differ significantly.112 While the United States and Canada routinely report the date and location of each strike, other nations only report weekly or monthly. In the case of Belgium and the Arab members of the coalition, no public reporting of any actions presently occurs. With air strikes being carried out by multiple actors, including the Syrian and Iraqi air forces, as well as by the Islamic Republic of Iran — often at the same locations as coalition strikes — it remains impossible for affected civilians to know, in most circumstances, which State was responsible for an event, a concern noted by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).113 Transparency on the part of coalition States conducting these operations is therefore imperative. 58. The Special Rapporteur recalls that, in any case in which civilians have been, or appeared to have been, killed, the State responsible is under an obligation to conduct a prompt, independent and impartial fact-finding inquiry and to provide a detailed public explanation. This obligation is triggered whenever there is a plausible indication from any source that civilian casualties have been sustained, including where the facts are unclear or the information partial or circumstantial, and whether civilian casualties were anticipated or not.114 G. Role of the Security Council in authorizing the use of force 59. The actions of ISIL have undermined international peace and security, grossly and systematically abused the fundamental rights of civilians on a wide scale, gravely violated international humanitarian law and international human rights law and fractured the territorial integrity of two States. Nonetheless, not all the permanent members of the Security Council are in favour of taking more robust military measures. As noted by the Secretary-General, the privileges of tenure and the veto power that the permanent members of the Council have been granted under the Charter entail a particular responsibility to not employ their veto in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to the responsibility to protect civilians.115 The Special Rapporteur notes that, given the reports relating to the possible commission of acts of genocide, Council members may have a more specific responsibility116 given that they are all bound by the obligation to prevent this most 111 112 113 114 115 116 See “Rule of terror”, para. 23. See Chris Woods, “Pentagon in Denial About Civilian Casualties of U.S. Airstrikes in Iraq and Syria,” Foreign Policy, 3 December 2014. Available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/03/pentagon-in-denial-about-civilian-casualties-of-u-s-airstrikes-iniraq-and-syria/. See UNAMI/OHCHR, “Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September–10 December 2014”, footnote 32. See A/68/389, paras. 41–45. See the report of the Secretary-General on implementing the responsibility to protect (A/63/677), para. 61. “A State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed”. See the International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits), Judgement of 26 February 2007, paras. 430 and 431. 19