A/HRC/29/51 all parts of the globe.10 It is reported that most have joined the ranks of ISIL owing to its perceived success,11 the ease with which one can join and its online presence and propaganda.12 The proclamation by its leader of ISIL as a caliphate13 has reportedly galvanized support from radicalized individuals and groups around the world. Individuals join ISIL not only to fight, but also to assist in the building of a “State”, with ISIL promoting a sense of religious duty, 14 attracting individuals from diverse backgrounds. 15 Many of these recruits are reportedly experienced fighters, or have the ability to attract others through propaganda. 16 Foreign nationals play a prominent role in the religious, educational and judiciary “systems” of ISIL, which further radicalizes communities under its authority.17 It has been reported that the military leadership structures of ISIL are largely dominated by foreign fighters.18 19. ISIL has consolidated its control over the populations in the territory it holds. By taking advantage of the instability in both Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic,19 its ideology and financial capabilities have found resonance among socially and economically desperate communities. It has exploited the existing social fragmentations among sectarian and tribal lines to secure a new network of alliances.20 Most importantly, through the use of tactics that instil terror in the population, including the calculated use of public brutality and indoctrination, as well as the establishment of monopolistic control over basic services, ISIL has ensured the submission of the communities under its control.21 20. ISIL is an organized group22 that functions under a formalized command with an essentially vertical and hierarchical command structure.23 It is composed of an armed force, an administrative wing and a religious wing, all under the control of the self-proclaimed caliph, Al-Baghdadi.24 It operates a harsh, rigid administrative system that is based on provinces and comprises the Al-Hisbah morality police, the general police force, courts and entities managing recruitment, tribal relations and education.25 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 6 See Richard Barrett, Foreign Fighters in Syria (New York, The Soufan Group, 2014). See also S/2014/815, para. 87. See S/2014/815, para. 14. See Saltman and Winter, Islamic State. See “It ain’t half hot here, mum: why and how Westerners go to fight in Syria and Iraq”, The Economist, 30 August 2014. See Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror. See “Rule of terror”, paras. 17 and 29. See also Stern and Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, which notes that in an article in Dabiq, the online English-language magazine of ISIL, it asked for doctors, engineers, scholars and people with military, administrative and service expertise. See Saltman and Winter, Islamic State. See the report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/28/69), para. 127. See “Rule of terror” paras. 12 and 13. See S/2014/815, para. 8. See “Rule of terror”, para. 9. Ibid., para. 1, and A/HRC/28/69, para. 35. See British Broadcasting Corporation, “UK paying experts to build Islamic State war crimes case”, 3 September 2014. Available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29052475. See “Rule of terror”, para. 13. See S/2014/815, paras. 13–17. See A/HRC/28/69, para. 36.