A/HRC/36/48 prescribed medicine or follow a certain regime, is respected and to prevent the robot from coercing the older person into adhering to the caregivers’ instructions. 39. Older persons must not only retain the whole range of decision-making powers other adults have, but they should also not be penalized for their decisions. Systems may for, instance, signal a deviation from prescribed or expected behaviour to other actors, such as caregivers, health professionals or even insurance companies. A human rights-based approach prescribes that autonomy must prevail in the use of assistive and robotics technology. 2. Dignity and human rights 40. Dignity is the founding principle of human rights law and underpins international policy documents on ageing. Given that human rights developed in response to specific violations of human dignity, they may thus be regarded as specifications of human dignity. 4 Measures and policies related to ageing require a human rights footing in order to be apt in defining the extent to which older persons can live in dignity. 41. The use of assistive technology and robotics in the care of older persons can either enhance or compromise their dignity. It therefore needs to be rigorously scrutinized. The use of restraints, disempowering practices, and neglect of the users’ needs and preferences have been found to violate the standard of dignity in care settings. A robot, for instance, that moves people around or feeds them without consulting them may amount to an undignified way of providing services. The obligation to wear a special uniform at all times to prevent falls, without any consideration of the disgracing effect towards older persons, may violate a person’s dignity (see A/HRC/22/53). 42. The introduction of assistive technology and care robots raises questions about the kind of care society seeks to provide to older persons. Policy decisions reflect society’s values and biases. Assistive technology and robotics promise a large potential in sustaining older persons’ independence and improving their quality of life. However, when technology becomes an end point, it might restrict the full potential of older persons as well. 43. Insofar as technology does not help older persons regain agency and fulfil their aspirations, it maintains a dependency culture. Where robots remain the only form of interaction for older persons, technology may even become debilitating and anchor a paradigm of disempowerment. 44. The introduction of technology cannot substitute for the State’s obligations to support older persons. It should also not lead to a collective disengagement from the duty to support them. Evading social responsibility for this group, as in practice society discounts older persons’ inherent worth, breaches the universality of the right to support. Adequate support is a precondition for the effective exercise of all human rights on an equal footing with others and therefore to live with dignity. 45. Overreliance on technology may portray older persons as a burden rather than human beings with inherent dignity. Attention must be paid, so that technology targeting the older population does not stigmatize older persons as frail and needy of assistance. Technologies that reinforce stereotypical images of older persons and nourish their oppression, exclusion and segregation do not comply with human dignity, despite their promise to enhance autonomy and independence. 46. An issue raised in relation to the introduction of assistive technology and robotics in care is the objectification of older persons. Care is not merely a form of service provision, it is both the attitude of concern for the individual and the actual activity of caregiving and, as such, it confers value on the care recipient. If assistance is provided in a manner that diminishes the individual, it is disrespectful of the person’s dignity. 47. The human touch is considered an important part of caring. It is a necessity for people’s well-being and feelings. A paradigm of care that solely or primarily relies on 4 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, “The concept of human dignity and the realistic utopia of human rights”, Metaphilosophy, vol. 41, No. 4 (2010), pp. 464-480. 9