A/HRC/40/52 period happening in 2018, and only 10 in 2014.8 In the cases dealt with by Front Line: International Foundation for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders in 2018, 58 per cent of the human rights defenders charged were charged under security legislation. 9 Under the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, over 67 per cent of all communications sent about civil society in 2018 related to alleged proceedings under counter-terrorism or other broad security-related charges. These findings demand fundamental review of the use (and misuse) of counter-terrorism law and practice around the globe, and the implementation of robust oversight and of accountability for attendant human rights violations. A. Counter-terrorism architecture, security imperatives and civil society 5. It is no coincidence that the proliferation of security measures to counter terrorism and to prevent and counter violent extremism, on the one hand, and the adoption of measures that restrict civic space, on the other, are happening simultaneously. 10 The ramping up of security space, leading to the narrowing of civic space, can be directly traced back to the international security-focused dynamic that emerged in 2001, and the embedding of international matrices in the global counter-terrorism architecture in order to authorize and sustain security measures. 6. The determination with which the international community took draconian measures after 11 September 2001 and the blanket approach to counter-terrorism legislation, which left no room for a determination of the necessity and proportionality of the measures, revealed a global consensus on a zero-risk imperative with respect to countering terrorism. Despite the advice given by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Security Council to ensure that counter-terrorism measures do not unduly curtail human rights, or give others a pretext to do so,11 the Council’s binding resolutions consistently lack a comprehensive definition of terrorism and of violent extremism and requirements for comprehensive assessment of the human rights impact of the required measures. 12 In addition, the post2001 period has seen the emergence of new entities intrinsic to the global counter-terrorism architecture, whose relationship to traditional regulatory bodies and oversight remain opaque and underregulated. Here, recommendation 8 of the obscure but influential Financial Action Task Force has proved to be a useful tool for a number of States as a means of reducing civil society space and suppressing political opposition,13 and has caused “incalculable damage to civil society”.14 7. For civil society, the international primacy of security over human rights was translated into polarizing political rhetoric: “with us or with the terrorists”. This has led to the targeting of civil society members who question the legitimacy of the counter-terrorism measures. Loose international frameworks requiring national implementation have provided Governments with the means to secure their own power by silencing voices questioning their legitimacy or their policies on human rights grounds. As the phenomena being tackled are undefined or vaguely defined, existing matrices allow States to qualify threats to themselves as terrorism, violent extremism, extremism or, even more broadly, threats to national security. 15 In an article co-authored by the first person to serve as the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 “Targeting the messenger: journalists ensnared by national security legislation, 2014–18” (2019). “Global Analysis 2018”. This includes charges under provisions relating to national or State security or sedition (17 per cent), defamation, insulting the State or damaging national unity (17 per cent), spreading fake news, rumours or propaganda (14 per cent), terrorism or membership or support of a terrorist organization (9 per cent) and cybercrime (1 per cent). General Assembly resolution 68/181. First Security Council open debate on counter-terrorism, 18 January 2002. Notably, resolutions 1373 (2001), 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017). See also A/73/361. A/70/371, para. 24. Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Counterterrorism measures and civil society”, p. 5. In March 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern regarding this approach, and referred to similar concerns expressed by 17 special procedure mandate holders. (See the introductory statement by the High Commissioner at the fifty-eighth session of the Commission on Human Rights). 3