A/HRC/40/48 Statute of the International Criminal Court. He voiced some concern over article 7, noting that it may go too far and that the reference to “competent” courts was ambiguous. Concerning article 13, the panellist pointed out that the ending qualification in article 13 (2) could create a big loophole with respect to the treaty’s application. Additionally, he suggested simplifying article 13, making it more explicit that international human rights law enjoys primacy over investment and trade agreements. 8. The fourth panellist found articles 6 and 7 generally helpful but suggested that certain language be clarified. With respect to article 13, she expressed two key concerns. First, the provisions relating to trade and investment could be made stronger: the primacy of human rights should be clearly stated and there should be a new provision requiring human rights language to be placed in trade and investment agreements. Second, she voiced concern that article 13(1), which reaffirms principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity, could be used to justify restrictions of other parts of the instrument, in particular in relation to extraterritorial jurisdiction. C. Article 9 9. The first panellist stressed the importance of including an article on prevention in the Draft LBI. States remain the main actor to protect human rights, and while non-binding instruments have provided guidelines for improving human rights protection, gaps remain in domestic systems (such as the lack of human rights safeguards and non-recognition of corporate criminal responsibility). This instrument has the potential to improve human rights due diligence systems on a large scale. She suggested that guidance could be sought from the 2018 report of the Working Group on Business and Human Rights to the General Assembly on human rights due diligence (A/73/163). 10. The second panellist emphasized the well-documented harm caused by companies’ reckless handling of hazardous substances. In order to address this, he argued that States should compel companies to actively monitor and prevent violations. Mandatory human rights due diligence should go beyond what is in article 9 (2) and be transparent and traceable through the supply chain. Additionally, it should cover actual and potential exposure to toxic waste. 11. The third panellist agreed that article 9 is a crucial aspect of the Draft LBI and noted that the text should reference “human rights” due diligence so as to distinguish it from the due diligence conducted in business transactions. He suggested aligning the text better with that of the UNGPs and OECD guidelines, specifically with respect to the mitigation and tracking of impacts. The panellist warned against permitting exemptions in article 9(5) for small and medium-sized enterprises, as corporations would find a way to exploit this. Additionally, he advocated the inclusion of a defence for companies which took all precautions possible. 12. The fourth panellist did not support the Draft LBI or Optional Protocol and reaffirmed the business community’s support for the UNGPs. In her view, article 9 unhelpfully departs from the UNGPs and adopts an unrealistic, outcome-based standard regarding due diligence. She emphasized that no business in the world – irrespective of its size – operates in a legal vacuum. States have the responsibility to pass laws that meet international standards and to enforce those laws for all companies in their jurisdiction. The first line of defence for rights abuses should be a strong and effective domestic rule of law. D. Articles 10, 11 and 12 13. The first panellist recommended that any binding instrument should build on and complement the UNGPs. He noted that article 10 omits details on administrative penalties and preventive remedies, and suggested it might be useful to consider non-judicial mechanisms. He emphasized that the obligations in article 10 (1) should be limited to the territory or jurisdiction of the relevant States. Additionally, he expressed doubts over article 10 (4) since legal reforms would be needed to implement the provision, and questioned the restriction in article 10 (8) to “intentional” acts. With respect to article 11, he asked for greater 25