A/HRC/10/3 page 12 38. In some countries intelligence agencies have legally acquired the power to arrest and detain people who are expected to have information about terrorist activities.28 Preventive detention for public security reasons, including that of interrogating persons for intelligence purposes, may in exceptional circumstances be a proportionate interference with the right to liberty, provided the detention has clear and accessible basis in the law, information on the reasons for detention have been given and the detention is subject to judicial review.29 Detention must not be arbitrary,30 and compensation in the case of unjustified detention must be available.31 The Special Rapporteur is concerned about situations where persons are detained for a long period of time for the sole purpose of intelligence-gathering or on broad grounds in the name of prevention. These situations constitute arbitrary deprivation of liberty.32 The existence of grounds for continued detention should be determined by an independent and impartial court. Without delay, the continued detention of such a person triggers a duty for the authorities to establish whether criminal suspicions can be confirmed and, if this is the case, to bring charges against the suspect and to put him on trial. The mere “administrative” detention of a person, for the sole purpose of gathering information would be unlawful.33 39. The Special Rapporteur is gravely concerned about situations in which intelligence agencies wield arrest and detention powers, but where there is no effective judicial oversight over the actions of the intelligence services, resulting in impunity. In Algeria for example, the military intelligence service (DRS) specializes in detaining and interrogating people who are believed to possess information about the terrorist activities of armed groups acting within Algeria or of international terrorist networks acting abroad. Articles 12 and 16 of the Criminal Procedure Code stipulate that in exercising these functions the DRS operates under the authority of the prosecutor. However, reports indicate that actually the DRS is operating without any civilian oversight.34 Unlike cases where arrests are carried out by police or gendarmerie officers, prosecutors seem not to be informed of arrests carried out by the DRS. Prosecutors apparently do 28 See also the earlier comments of the Special Rapporteur on compulsory hearings in Australia (A/HRC/4/26/Add.3, paras. 31-32 and 46-47). 29 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 8 (1982) on article 9 (Right to liberty and security of persons), para. 4. 30 See also ECHR, Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, para. 32. 31 See for instance, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, report No. 2/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. (1997), para. 12. 32 See also the comments of the Special Rapporteur on the situation in Guantanamo Bay (A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, paras. 13-14). 33 See for instance Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, ECHR, 19 November 1988, para. 53; Murray v. the United Kingdom, ECHR, 28 October 1994, para. 67. 34 Eminent Jurist Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, forthcoming report, chapter IV, part 2.2.2.