A/HRC/10/3 page 14 international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict,40 which were drafted to apply even in the demanding circumstances of armed conflict. 4. Oversight and review mechanisms of intelligence agencies 42. As the main beneficiary of intelligence information, the executive must effectively supervise and direct the actions of the intelligence agency. These directions should be put in writing,41 and outline in detail which actions the agencies may and must not carry out vis-à-vis which persons. At stake is not only the oversight and control of the intelligence services but also preventing so-called “plausible deniability”42 on behalf of the executive and holding the latter accountable for potential abuses. The Special Rapporteur stresses in this context that authorization for covert actions must be consistent with the human rights obligations of States not only for legal and moral, but also for intelligence reasons.43 43. Authorization for an agency to assassinate, disappear or arbitrarily detain terrorist suspects can never be justified as a legitimate intelligence-led preventive approach to counter-terrorism. Equally, giving powers to arrest and detain high-value detainees in secret detention centres, or allowing inhuman and degrading treatment of suspects under the name of “enhanced interrogation techniques” for the purpose of gathering information44 are clear violations of international law. The Special Rapporteur stresses in this regard that the “necessity defence” as it is known in the criminal law of some countries must never serve as a policy or an ex ante justification for the use of prohibited interrogation techniques - even in so-called “ticking bomb” situations.45 40 A/63/467-S/2008/636. 41 See for instance: Act CXXV 1995 on National Security, Hungary, section 11; the Dutch Security and Intelligence Services Act 2002, art. 19; and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984, section 7 (1) and (2). 42 “Plausible deniability” refers to the deliberate creation of power structures and chains of command which are loose and informal enough to enable denying the involvement of the executive when a human rights violation is being disclosed. 43 See for instance United States Senate Armed Services Committee inquiry into the treatment of detainees in United States custody, 12 December 2008, p. xii: “The fact is that senior officials in the United States Government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees. Those efforts damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and compromised our moral authority.” 44 J. Warrick, “CIA tactics endorsed in secret memos”, Washington Post, 15 October 2008. 45 See A/HRC/6/17/Add.4, paras. 17-21.