A/HRC/10/3 page 22 60. The human rights obligations of States, in particular the obligation to ensure an effective remedy, require that such legal provisions must not lead to a priori dismissal of investigations, or prevent disclosure of wrongdoing, in particular when there are reports of international crimes or gross human rights violations.74 The blanket invocation of State secrets privilege with reference to complete policies, such as the United States secret detention, interrogation and rendition programme75 or third-party intelligence (under the policy of “originator control” (see paragraph 48 above)) prevents effective investigation and renders the right to a remedy illusory. This is incompatible with article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It could also amount to a violation of the obligation of States to provide judicial assistance to investigations that deal with gross human rights violations and serious violations of international humanitarian law. 76 61. In order to enable effective investigations to take place, the Special Rapporteur is of the opinion that robust whistle-blower protection mechanisms for intelligence agents and other informers are crucial in order to break illegitimate rings of secrecy. Reliable factual information about serious human rights violations by an intelligence agency is most likely to come from within the agency itself. In these cases, the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in non-disclosure. Such whistle-blowers should firstly be protected from legal reprisals and disciplinary action when disclosing unauthorized information. Secondly, independent oversight mechanisms must be able to give whistle-blowers and informants the necessary protections, which could be modelled on the witness protection programmes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court. 62. The Special Rapporteur emphasizes the important work many investigative journalists and non-governmental organizations do around the world in uncovering human rights violations by intelligence agencies. Often accountability is not triggered by formal mechanisms, but through 74 See for instance Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, judgement, 25 November 2003, para. 180; ECHR, Imakayeva v. Russia, judgement, 9 November 2006. 75 In El-Masri v. Tenet, the Government filed a declaration by CIA director Porter J. Goss which argued that the claims alleged by rendition victim El-Masri would force the CIA to admit or deny the existence of clandestine CIA activities, and that therefore dismissal of the suit was the only proper outcome on the basis of State secrets privilege. (Assertion of a Formal Claim of State Secrets Privilege and Request for Expedited Consideration, 8 March 2006, United States District Court - Eastern District of Virginia, Case No. 1:05-cv-1417-TSE-TRJ). See also the declarations of James B. Comey, acting Attorney General and Tom Ridge, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 18 January 2005 in Arar v. Ashcroft C.A. No. 04-CV-249-DGT-VVP. 76 See principle 12 of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 60/147.