A/HRC/36/54 whatever their character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State. 11 The Commission was able to ascertain that, since April 2015, the defence and security forces have been the principal perpetrators of human rights violations in Burundi, even when they acted jointly with non-State actors such as the Imbonerakure. 18. Members of the National Intelligence Service, including senior officials, in Bujumbura and in several provinces have committed acts for which the State can be held responsible, including extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances, acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and sexual violence. The National Intelligence Service reports directly to the President of the Republic and its operations are managed by an Administrator General. 19. The Burundian National Police have played an active role since the first demonstrations against President Nkurunziza’s candidature for a new term in office. Since April 2015, police officers have committed summary executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances, acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and sexual violence. Some units, including the Unit for the Protection of Institutions (Appui à la protection des institutions) and the Anti-Riot Brigade, which was established in September 2015, have been particularly implicated in gross violations of human rights. 20. The Burundian army (National Defence Force), which kept a low profile at the beginning of the crisis, has played an increasingly active role in the repression of real or presumed opponents. In the testimonies collected by the Commission, military personnel have been identified as the alleged perpetrators of summary executions, arbitrary arrests, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Among the units involved in grave violations of human rights, the Commission has identified the Special Brigade for the Protection of Institutions, the Combat Engineer Battalion (Camp Muzinda) and the Support Battalion of the First Military Region (Camp Muha) in Bujumbura. 21. The Commission also documented cases in which local administrative authorities committed or ordered the commission of human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests. 22. A number of testimonies showed that, in reality, the State operates largely through a parallel structure based on personal ties inherited from the time when certain CNDD-FDD authorities were waging an underground armed struggle; these ties were strengthened in response to the opposition of some party members who, starting in 2014, had said they were not in favour of a new term in office for President Nkurunziza. 12 Major decisions, including those that have given rise to gross violations of human rights, are allegedly taken not by the Government but by the President and his entourage of “generals”, including the Minister of Public Security, the Administrator General of the National Intelligence Service, the heads of the President’s civil cabinet and office of police affairs, and the Secretary General of CNDD-FDD. This entourage apparently transmits its decisions through a parallel chain of command, the structure of which varies from one branch and one province to another, with the result that subordinates might sometimes hold more power than their superiors. For example, the Commission ascertained that the Deputy Inspector General of the Police had more power than the Inspector General. 2. Responsibility of the State for the conduct of non-State individuals or groups 23. Under international law, including human rights law, the State may be held generally responsible for the wrongful conduct of non-State individuals or groups when the latter are acting in “complete dependence”13 on the State. It might also be held responsible 11 12 13 6 Article 4, paragraph 1, of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts (General Assembly resolution 56/83). Many high-ranking CNDD-FDD members informed President Nkurunziza of their opposition to his candidature in the 2015 election. Most of them were subsequently forced to flee the country out of concern for their safety. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007. GE.17-13865