A/HRC/36/54 in cases in which non-State individuals or groups act on its instructions or under its direction or its “effective control”14 and also when its own agents acknowledge and adopt the conduct of non-State groups. 15 Bearing these principles in mind, the Commission examined the question of the responsibility of the Burundian State for the acts committed by Imbonerakure, whose involvement in extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances and acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and sexual violence it was able to document. 24. The Commission cannot infer the “complete dependence” of the Imbonerakure on the Burundian State, as this would imply “a particularly great degree of State control over” the persons or entities in question.16 A certain alignment17 of the Imbonerakure (and, more generally, of CNDD-FDD) with the Government’s policy should nevertheless be emphasized. 25. The Commission was, however, able to establish that members, including senior officials, of the National Intelligence Service, the police, the army and the President’s office have close ties to some Imbonerakure, to whom they give instructions or directives to commit human rights violations. 26. In some cases, the Commission was also able to establish the exercise of “effective control” by agents of the State over some Imbonerakure. Numerous witnesses testified that Imbonerakure were present alongside police and intelligence officers, including in detention centres, when violations were committed and that Imbonerakure were seen wearing the same uniforms and carrying the same weapons as the police or the army in the presence and in full view of members of those forces. Moreover, as far as the Commission is aware, very few Imbonerakure have been prosecuted or convicted, and this, in itself, is indicative of a certain degree of indulgence on the part of the Burundian authorities which suggests the existence of a form of control. 27. The Commission also received reports to the effect that some Imbonerakure arrested individuals and handed them over to the National Intelligence Service or the police. This indicates that their conduct was acknowledged and adopted by the authorities. 3. Responsibility of armed opposition groups 28. The Commission received reports concerning targeted attacks by armed opposition groups against military and police posts, as well as more large-scale attacks such as those in Kayanza Province in July 2015 and in and around Bujumbura on 11 December 2015. On the other hand, the Commission was unable to obtain information concerning attacks against civilians by organized armed groups with a known structure. The obstacles to these investigations were partly attributable to the difficulty of gaining access to witnesses, many of whom are in Burundi, and to the fact that the Burundian Government shared no information with the Commission. 14 15 16 17 GE.17-13865 See article 8 of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986; and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007. Article 11 of the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. In its general comment No. 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Right to Life (Article 4), the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights expressed the view that a State could be held responsible for killings by non-State actors if it approved, supported or acquiesced in those acts. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007. The International Court of Justice nevertheless requires “systematic alignment” in order to demonstrate “complete dependence” (ibid.). 7