A/HRC/18/32 and the corresponding need for an international legal instrument to regulate private military and security companies. The Working Group remains of the opinion that an international regulatory framework should take the form of a new binding international convention on private military and security companies, including improved registration, licensing and vetting procedures, strengthened national legislation and accountability, and oversight mechanisms. 65. The Working Group is of the view that international law does not sufficiently regulate the activities of private military and security companies. As non-State actors, these companies are not directly subject to international human rights obligations. Furthermore, company employees cannot usually be considered mercenaries according to the definition set out in article 47 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, and article 1 of the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. It is therefore necessary to strengthen and clarify the accountability mechanisms for private military and security companies that violate human rights and to elaborate more explicitly the obligations of States with regard to them. 66. Similarly, the Working Group ascertained that national regulation is insufficient to ensure that all private military and security companies are subject to adequate registration, monitoring and oversight procedures. The transnational nature of their activities raises jurisdictional obstacles as well as practical difficulties for the prosecution of human rights abuses at the national level in that a State’s ability to locate witnesses and collect the necessary evidence in another State in order to ensure successful prosecution is limited. Only an international convention could sufficiently counter the problem of impunity for private military and security companies that violate international human rights law. 67. In countries with weak judicial systems or without sufficient national legislative mechanisms for prosecuting private military and security companies, an international convention would reaffirm the right of victims to an effective remedy, create an obligation of mutual legal assistance, and provide an alternative international recourse for those who cannot exercise their rights at the national level. 68. In addition to analysing the use of private military and security companies by Governments, the Working Group examined their use by international organizations, such as the United Nations, which sometimes employs such companies to facilitate operations in conflict areas. The Working Group has requested information from several United Nations departments with a view to assessing the extent of the use of private military and security companies, the types of activities the United Nations outsources to private contractors, and the strength of United Nations regulatory policies and monitoring of private military and security companies.8 Drawing on this information and discussions with the Department of Safety and Security, the Working Group determined that the United Nations currently lacks a firm system-wide policy governing the hiring of such companies. Furthermore, the problem of accountability for their conduct becomes more complex in cases where international organizations rather than States employ private military and security companies. While the United Nations is in the process of developing its policy regarding the use of private military and security companies and has sought the guidance of the Working Group, the Working Group considers that an international convention would be invaluable in strengthening and clarifying the institutional responsibility of international organizations, such as the United Nations, for the conduct of private military and security companies. An international convention would ensure the establishment of formal, systemwide policies for registration and oversight of companies and vetting and human rights training requirements for employees. 8 A/65/325, paras. 30-37. 15