A/HRC/32/36/Add.2 channels maintained. Preventing or obstructing people from expressing their grief and anger in reaction to such a tremendous loss creates opportunities for such sentiments to grow into something more insidious and potentially violent. 84. The Special Rapporteur was alarmed at the apparent politicization of the Sewol ferry disaster. The yellow ribbon adopted by the victims’ families as illustrative and supportive of their cause, appears now to be interpreted as an anti-Government symbol. Equating demands for accountability and transparency, the hallmarks of the rule of law, with attempts to undermine the Government per se, has no place in a democratic society. In his view, the Government handling of the protests around the Sewol ferry disaster is emblematic of an approach that seeks to stifle expressions of dissatisfaction, leading to polarization over an issue that should otherwise encourage solidarity and collaboration to address perceived shortcomings. VI. National Human Rights Commission of Korea 85. The National Human Rights Commission of Korea was established in 2001 by the National Human Rights Commission Act and consists of 11 members selected or nominated by the President, the National Assembly and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As the national human rights institution, it investigates complaints, issues policy recommendations and conducts education campaigns. The Commission is currently accredited with “A” status by the International Coordinating Committee of the National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (known as the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions since March 2016). The Committee deferred re-accreditation in 2015 over concerns that a clear, transparent and participatory selection and appointment process for commissioners was not included in relevant legislation and practice. Further, there were concerns that commissioners were not immune from legal liability for actions undertaken in good faith when acting in their official capacity. 86. Those issues were echoed by civil society interlocutors as contributing to their perception that the Commission was ineffective. In their view, under its previous leadership it was slow to react and reluctant to issue decisions or statements on urgent and politically sensitive cases of violations of human rights; lacked visibility when significant issues of human rights came to the fore; and failed to make timely decisions on complaints before it. For example, the Special Rapporteur was informed that 20 cases arising from the Sewol ferry disaster filed with the Commission after the tragedy in April 2014 had not been decided upon a year later. Five of the cases were subsequently dismissed but the complainants were not notified. Civil society was also dissatisfied with the relationship between the sector and the Commission and considered its operations inaccessible and not transparent. 87. On behalf of the Commission, the Chair acknowledged awareness of those concerns and stated that the Commission was making efforts to improve communication with stakeholders and to strengthen diversity and its legal framework. It has made 32 recommendations related to the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly: 16 have been accepted by the Government, 6 have received partial acceptance, 5 have not been accepted; and 2 are still under review. Unfortunately, the recommendations of the Commission are not binding. In relation to simultaneous assemblies, the Commission has called for the removal of legal provisions that allow the banning of the later notified assembly owing to abuse of that clause. It also found that article 12 of the Assemblies and Demonstrations Act, which allows the banning of assemblies that may interrupt the flow of traffic, was inappropriate. 18