A/HRC/22/33 themselves however they can to regain control of the north”. These militias, though poorly equipped, are very organized. They distribute their own membership cards to national troops. The Mission has also received information about radio broadcasts mobilizing young people to join the militias. The presence of children under 18 years of age enlisted in Ganda Izo and the FLN has been reported. VIII. Ethnic dimension of the crisis and attendant risks 63. The Mission was alarmed by the growing ethnic dimension of the crisis. Although for a long time, life in Mali was apparently harmonious, many stories have highlighted the strong ethnic ramifications of the current crisis that seem to stem from uneven development among the regions, the persistence of impunity, discrimination on ethnic and racial grounds as well as past conflicts and violence, including the Tuareg rebellions that were very much concealed, repressed and denied. The strongest ethnic tensions were observed between the Arab and Tuareg communities on the one hand, and other ethnic groups in Mali, on the other hand. The Mission received testimony from all sides concerning discriminatory and humiliating acts, abuse and violence (sometimes resulting in death) motivated by ethnic considerations. The Mission also heard similar statements of incitement to racial hatred from the persons interviewed. The Mission observed a deep sense of frustration and desire for revenge among many of the people it met. Although the ethnic issue remains taboo in Mali, it is insidiously leading to the polarization of society, divisions and potential reprisals. IX. Humanitarian access in the north 64. Following the extreme violence carried out by armed groups at the beginning of 2012 and the massive destruction of basic infrastructures, the State and its agents swiftly withdrew from the northern territories. The vast majority of humanitarian and development organizations have left the area; only a minority has stayed there and is generally operating with local staff. The effective delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid in the north has often proved problematic and difficult to monitor. With one or two exceptions, there was no reliable, independent system for monitoring distribution of humanitarian aid at the time of the Mission’s visit. 65. For the most part, the humanitarian actors in the area have had to negotiate with armed groups the strategies and methods for distributing aid, without necessarily organizing the whole process. The Mission has heard of cases where aid is entirely under the unilateral control of armed groups, without any guarantee that it has been distributed to recipients. Some leaders of armed groups and local public figures allegedly distribute humanitarian aid received based on ethnic or religious grounds. The Mission also learned that aid has sometimes been distributed in mosques and, in such cases, not given directly to women. X. Conclusions and recommendations 66. Against a background of the increasing polarization of Malian society, it has been difficult to verify all information received. In this connection, given the limited time available to carry out the Mission and, considering the seriousness of the allegations reported, there is an urgent need for further study of the facts that can only be done by a United Nations commission of inquiry, in order to pave the way for a meaningful process of truth, justice and reconciliation. 67. The Mission wishes to point out that a possible military intervention by ECOWAS to help the Malian army regain control of the north could have major GE.13-10067 17