A/HRC/43/59 Annex III Militia and Drug Addiction in Conflict-Affected Areas I. Introduction This briefing paper, annexed to the report of the Special Rapporteur, provides a brief overview of the situation of militia and drug addiction in Myanmar, which is impacting on human rights. The aim of the briefing paper, which is drawn from open source material, 1 is to raise awareness of and encourage further research into the issues. For decades there has been a range of armed actors involved in Myanmar’s internal armed conflicts. Alongside the Myanmar military, or Tatmadaw, and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), there are numerous smaller armed groups known collectively as militia. The majority of militia are allied with the Tatmadaw and operate under its command.2 Currently, Myanmar may be the second largest producer of heroin in the world and the largest producer of methamphetamine.3 EAOs are often reported to be highly involved in the narcotic industry in Myanmar, however analysts suggest that militia allied to the Tatmadaw are among the key players.4 The scale of the industry and its connection to Myanmar’s conflicts has many serious implications for the situation of human rights in Myanmar. One of these is the serious harm it is inflicting on the civilian population by having resulted in high rates of drug addiction across the country, that is particularly acute in conflict-affected areas. II. Militia and the narcotic industry A. Background For decades the Tatmadaw has been engaged in armed conflicts in Myanmar’s border areas against dozens of EAOs from amongst the Karen, Karenni, Shan, Mon, Kachin, Chin and Rakhine and other ethnic groups. The peace process launched by the Government in 2011 is it at a standstill, and recent years have seen intense fighting in Myanmar. Alongside the Tatmadaw and the EAOs, there are many smaller conflict actors known collectively as militia. The majority are pro-Tatmadaw, operate under its command to varying degrees, and are part of its defence strategy; although they differ significantly in type, size and precise nature of their relationship with the Tatmadaw (for example, some may be under its direct command, some may even travel with Tatmadaw battalions, whereas some carry out security operations in designated areas). 5 The Tatmadaw has long incorporated militia into its command structure. However, despite the role they play for the Tatmadaw, they are expected to be self-funding. Under General Ne Win, the Government did not provide militia allied to the Tatmadaw with funding and instead authorized them to 1 2 3 4 5 24 With supporting research by Htike Htike for dissertation titled “The Politics of Illicit Drug Trade in Conflict: A comparative study of the contemporary Kachin War and Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar (Burma)” MSc Politics of Conflicts, Rights and Justice Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of London, 2019. For more information see “Militias in Myanmar” by John Buchanan for the Asia Foundation, 2016. For more information see “Transnational Organized Crime in Southeast Asia: Evolution, Growth and Impact” by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2019 and ICG, 2019. For more information see “Fire and Ice: Conflict and Drugs in Myanmar’s Shan State” by the International Crisis Group (ICG), 2019. Buchanan, 2016.