A/HRC/31/66 72. Practical recommendations: (a) States should ensure that a comprehensive community engagement strategy is in place that includes programmes and policies designed to build trust and communication among law enforcement officials, the media and other assembly monitors; (b) Authorities should proactively engage with monitors by communicating consistently before, during and after an assembly; by providing access and information to members of the media and other monitors; and by considering and responding to monitors’ reports after assemblies; (c) Authorities should routinely notify national human rights institutions or other relevant independent oversight bodies of anticipated assemblies and facilitate the access required for them to monitor properly all phases of the assembly; (d) States should prohibit by law any interference with the recording of an assembly, including the seizure or damage of any equipment, except that pursuant to a warrant from a judge, where the judge considers that it has probative value. G. The collection of personal information in relation to an assembly must not interfere impermissibly with privacy or other rights 73. The collection of accurate information by law enforcement may be useful to the proper management of assemblies, enabling law enforcement to discharge their responsibilities to prepare for and facilitate peaceful assemblies. The collection and processing of personal information, such as through recording devices, closed-circuit television and undercover policing, must comply with protections against arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy. 74. Legislation and policies regulating the collection and processing of information relating to assemblies or their organizers and participants must incorporate legality, necessity and proportionality tests. Given the intrusiveness of such methods, the threshold for these tests is especially high. Where they interfere with the exercise of rights, data collection and processing may represent a violation of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression. 75. The capacity to use communication technologies securely and privately is vital to the organization and conduct of assemblies. Restrictions to online access or expression must be necessary and proportionate and applied by a body independent of any political, commercial or other unwarranted influences, and there should be adequate safeguards against abuse (see A/HRC/17/27, para. 69). The practice of blocking communications — impeding the organization or publicizing of an assembly online — rarely satisfies these requirements (ibid., para. 31). 76. While there may be legitimate law enforcement and accountability reasons to record an assembly, the act of recording participants may have a chilling effect on the exercise of rights, including freedom of assembly, association and expression. Recording peaceful assembly participants in a context and manner that intimidates or harasses is an impermissible interference to these rights. 77. The use of undercover officers to collect intelligence relating to assemblies is problematic. It is highly intrusive and carries a high risk of rights violations and therefore should not be allowed unless reasonable grounds exist to suspect that a serious criminal act is likely to be committed. Authorities should consider whether the proposed undercover activity is the only way to secure the required information, and whether the value of the 17