A/HRC/14/27 State development assistance agencies, foreign and trade ministries and export finance institutions, as well as between them and host government agencies; and the possibility of developing early warning indicators for government agencies and companies. The lessons that the Special Representative took away from the first meeting are the need to address issues early before situations on the ground deteriorate and to improve in-country coordination between trade promotion and human rights functions within the same embassy. E. Extraterritorial jurisdiction 46. All States have the duty to protect against corporate-related human rights abuses within their territory and/or jurisdiction. In several policy domains, including anticorruption, anti-trust, securities regulation, environmental protection and general civil and criminal jurisdiction, States have agreed to certain uses of extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, this is typically not the case in business and human rights. 47. Legitimate issues are at stake and they are unlikely to be resolved fully anytime soon. However, the scale of the current impasse must and can be reduced. To take the most pressing case, what message do States wish to send victims of corporate-related abuse in conflict affected areas? Sorry? Work it out yourselves? Or that States will make greater efforts to ensure that companies based in, or conducting transactions through, their jurisdictions do not commit or contribute to such abuses, and to help remedy them when they do occur? Surely the latter is preferable. 48. In the heated debates about extraterritoriality regarding business and human rights, a critical distinction between two very different phenomena is usually obscured. One is jurisdiction exercised directly in relation to actors or activities overseas, such as criminal regimes governing child sex tourism, which rely on the nationality of the perpetrator no matter where the offence occurs. The other is domestic measures that have extraterritorial implications; for example, requiring corporate parents to report on the company’s overall human rights policy and impacts, including those of its overseas subsidiaries. The latter phenomenon relies on territory as the jurisdictional basis, even though it may have extraterritorial implications. 49. Thus, extraterritoriality is not a binary matter: it comprises a range of measures. Indeed, one can imagine a matrix, with two rows and three columns. Its rows would be domestic measures with extraterritorial implications; and direct extraterritorial jurisdiction over actors or activities abroad. Its columns would be public policies for companies (such as CSR and public procurement policies, export credit agency criteria, or consular support); regulation (through corporate law, for instance); and enforcement actions (adjudicating alleged breaches and enforcing judicial and executive decisions). Their combination yields six types of “extraterritorial” form, each in turn offering a range of options. Not all are equally likely to trigger objections under all circumstances. 50. The Special Representative will continue to consult on how to unpack the broad and highly politicized category of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Distinguishing what is truly problematic from measures that are entirely permissible under international law would be in the best interests of all concerned: the victims of corporate-related human rights abuse; host Governments that may lack the capacity for dealing with the problem; companies that may face operational disruptions or protracted and unpredictable law suits; and the home country itself, whose own reputation may be on the line. GE.10-12629 11