A/HRC/42/CRP.1 did not accept the arrangement. Vice-President Hadi won an uncontested presidential election in February 2012, officially ending Saleh’s 33 year rule. 102. In December 2012, President Hadi began attempts to restructure military and security institutions, dismissing many of Saleh’s relatives, including his son Ahmed, the head of the Republican Guard, who had been groomed as his successor, and Ali Mohsen alAhmar, the commander of the First Armoured Division.82 President Hadi dissolved the Republican Guard and Central Security Forces. Officers loyal to Saleh resisted the new structure, and Saleh-linked units remained the dominant force on the ground from Sana’a to Aden.83 103. At the request of the United Nations Security Council, the Secretary-General established in 2012 a special political mission for Yemen focused on supporting the return to a peaceful political transition. Jamal Benomar, a British-Moroccan UN official, was appointed as the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Yemen, leading the mission.84 104. In March 2013, the Yemen National Dialogue Conference (NDC) mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 2051 (2012) and the GCC agreement paving the way to a peaceful political transition began. Five hundred and sixty five (565) representatives from political parties and other groups including the Houthis, youth, and women participated. 85 The NDC ended on 25 January 2014 with the adoption of an Outcome Document that was to serve as the foundation for a new constitution. The NDC outcomes called for Yemen to become a federation with special status for Sana’a and Aden, and various other political, judicial, military and security reforms.86 A presidential committee established by President Hadi decided on a new federal structure dividing Yemen into six regions. This process was protested against by many who felt it lacked sufficient debate and inclusion, including the southerners who wanted a North-South arrangement, and Ansar Allah leaders who cited concerns with the division of land, which restricted their access to coastal lands. 105. Tensions began to grow in June and July 2014 when an armed offensive was launched in Amran Governorate by members of “Popular Committees” (armed groups) affiliated with the Houthis, and former Yemeni armed forces and tribesmen loyal to former President Saleh. This marked the beginning of a period of alliance between former President Saleh, forces loyal to him, and the Houthis and their affiliated Popular Committees (hereinafter referred to as “Houthi-Saleh fighters”).87 106. In August 2014, tens of thousands of pro-Houthi demonstrators took to the streets in Sana’a and several other cities to protest against the Government’s decision to lift fuel subsidies, blaming President Hadi for failing to carry out the reforms promised and calling for the resignation of the Government. Members of the Popular Committees began arriving in Sana’a. Counter demonstrations by pro-Government supporters were held in Sana’a throughout September, some of which degenerated into violent clashes between opponents. The First Armoured Division, based outside of Sana’a, was the most powerful military unit in the country at the time. During the anti-Saleh protests in 2011 Ali Mohsen and his Division joined the protesters. 83 Yemen Presidential Decree 104, 19 December 2012, available at: http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news292153.htm; See also Zoltan Barany, Centre for Strategic International Studies, “The Challenges of Building a National Army in Yemen”, 14 July 2016, available. at: https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/160718_Challenges_Yemen_National_Army.pdf; see also https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22096125, 84 https://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sga1365.doc.htm. 85 Stephen W. Day, “The ‘Non Conclusion’ of Yemen’s National Dialogue,” Foreign Policy, 27 January 2014; for additional discussion on Yemen’s NDC see Erica Gaston, “Process Lessons Learned in Yemen’s National Dialogue,” United States Institute of Peace, February 2014. 86 See http://www.ndc.ye/default.aspx. 87 UN Human Rights - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of human rights in Yemen, 7 September 2015, A/HRC/30/31 (hereinafter ‘UN Human Rights Yemen Report 2015 - A/HRC/30/31’), pp. 3-4. 82 25