A/HRC/42/CRP.1 running frontline428 with its population subjected to over four years of fighting, varying degrees of impediments on the delivery of humanitarian supplies, and restrictions on movement. After the launch of “Operation Golden Spear” and the rapid advance in early 2017 by the Yemeni armed forces and affiliated armed groups, the government and affiliated forces consolidated positions on the western side of the governorate while the Houthis maintained control of northern and eastern areas, particularly the area of alHawban, east of Ta’izz. Despite Ta’izz being the object of a statement of understanding 429 between the parties to the conflict under the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement, little progress has been made to date to implement it, and Ta’izz continued to be a pawn for negotiation between the various parties in 2019. Dynamics within the city have been further complicated by the presence of various armed groups fighting alongside the Yemeni armed forces. The jostling for power among military and political actors who were united only in their fight against the Houthis, has led to armed confrontations between these various groups inside the city. In 2018-2019, Ta’izz witnessed violent confrontations between alIslah-affiliated groups and the main Salafist group inside the city. 301. The Group of Experts examined the situation in Ta’izz over two periods of time considered emblematic of the varying conflict dynamics in the governorate. First, the Group examined violations relating to the conflict in Ta’izz during its first year in 20152016, known as the “Battle of Ta’izz”, which followed the Houthi-Saleh takeover of the city in March 2015 and the ensuing hostilities between Houthi-Saleh fighters and the Resistance.430 This period was marked by the siege-like situation created by the HouthiSaleh fighters who cut off the main supply roads to the city after being pushed to its outskirts. Next, the Group examined violations taking place in 2018 and 2019 during the ongoing fight for the control of Ta’izz. While the “siege” continued to impact the city, this period was also marked by clashes that occurred between different armed groups affiliated with the Yemeni armed forces. The Group of Experts identified patterns of conduct that demonstrate the scale and scope of violations taking place and that present grave concerns for the risk of continued violations being committed, as these patterns show no signs of abating. This section is not exhaustive of all patterns or incidents of violations. 2. The Battle of Ta’izz (2015-2016) 302. On 22 March 2015, the Houthis, supported by armed groups loyal to former President Ali Abdallah Saleh whose role was instrumental in seizing Ta’izz, entered the governorate during their southern advance from Sana’a to Aden and seized the international airport of Ta’izz and other key locations. The Houthi-Saleh fighters soon set up military camps inside the city, leading to increasing local protests and the forming, in April, of the Resistance, which joined forces with citizens from Ta’izz and military brigades that remained loyal to President Hadi (battalions from the 22 and 35 Ta’izz brigades after the brigades split between the two parties). 303. Between March and July 2015, heavy fighting took place in Ta’izz city and surrounding districts between Houthi-Saleh fighters and those aligned with the Yemeni armed forces. This included apparently indiscriminate use of indirect-fire weapons such as mortars and artillery impacting civilians and civilian objects, and sniper-fire impacting or directed at civilians as hostilities took the shape of urban, street-by-street, fighting. Coalition forces provided support to the Resistance in Ta’izz through airstrikes on purported Houthi-Saleh positions and the airdrops of weapons and ammunition to the Resistance inside the city. In early July 2015, forces including Salafist groups from Aden reinforced the Resistance inside Ta’izz, pushing the Houthi-Saleh fighters out of the city. 428 https://www.acleddata.com/2018/12/07/yemens-urban-battlegrounds-violence-and-politics-insanaa-aden-taizz-and-hodeidah/ 429 Statement of Understanding on Ta’izz, available at https://osesgy.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/taiz_agreement_0.pdf 430 The “Popular Resistance” in Ta’izz (referred to herein as simply the “Resistance”) formed in April 2015, at the same time as Resistance groups were forming in other parts of the country. In Ta’izz, at its creation, the Resistance was compromised of fighters affiliated to al-Islah party, Salafists (Abu al Abbas battalion), as well as ordinary citizens from the city. 70