A/HRC/42/CRP.1 the government in the capital, Sana’a.74 In 2007, the former southern military officers who were forced to retire in the 1990s began to organise protests over the low pensions and lack of jobs, renewing southern secession calls and forming what became known as the Southern Movement, or “al-Hirak al-Janoubi”.75 98. Meanwhile, during the early 1990s, in northern Sa’dah Governorate, a group promoting the revival of Zaidi Shi’a teachings emerged in response to perceived increasing marginalisation of the Zaidi-majority population in the north by President Saleh (despite the fact that he was also a Zaidi) as well as in response to the spread of Salafi ‘Scientific Institutes’. The al-Shabab-al-Mu’min (meaning “the believing youth”) began with efforts to “revive” education about the Zaidi, whose Imams had ruled North Yemen through a combination of religious and secular means for one thousand years until 1962.76 The alShabab-al-Mu’min initially preached tolerance and peace, and enjoyed the support of the Government, who saw it as a “counterweight to Saudi-Wahhabi encroachment in the north of the country.”77 Only later, after the group aligned with Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, did it become entangled in politics and an armed wing was formed, initially in self-defence against a growing antagonism towards al-Houthi and his affiliates by the Government.78 The armed group under al-Houthi’s leadership became known as the “Houthis” after the death of Hussein al-Houthi in 2004, after which they fought under Abdel Malik al-Houthi in an insurgency campaign against the Yemeni government, commonly referred to as the Six Sa’dah wars that lasted from 2004 to 2010. 99. The Houthis, or Ansar Allah (also written Ansarullah, meaning Partisans of God), as the political movement refers to itself,79 has since come to be a group with wider participation crossing sectarian lines, with expressed goals of supporting a more democratic, non-sectarian republic in Yemen, as well as combating corruption, economic underdevelopment and political marginalisation in Yemen, while seeking greater autonomy for Zaidi-majority regions.80 100. Yemen also witnessed the emergence of radical Islamist groups during this time. In 2009, the al-Qa’eda Yemen branch, linked to attacks against a United States warship in Aden in 2000 and the United States Embassy in Sana’a in 2008 (among others), merged with al-Qa’eda members who moved to Yemen from Saudi Arabia to form a new organization, al-Qa’eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), later also known as Ansar alShari’a.81 Operations against the group by United States forces in cooperation with the Government of Yemen intensified from that time. 101. As the “Arab Spring” of popular revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa reached Yemen in January 2011, protesters took to the streets, calling for the removal of President Saleh. Though protests initially were peaceful, force was used to control them, including shooting of protesters. As the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) attempted to broker a deal for Saleh’s exit, non-violent protests evolved into a fragmented opposition of activists, political parties including al-Islah, and armed groups, such as the Houthis, alHirak al-Janoubi and AQAP. Saleh stepped down after signing a GCC deal that granted him immunity, transferring power to Vice-President Hadi. The Houthis and other groups Peter Salisbury, “Yemen’s Southern Powder Keg”, Chatham House Research Paper, March 2018, p. 10. 75 Ibid. 76 Brandt, M. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict, Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 116. 77 Ibid, p. 117 78 Ibid, pp. 157-164. 79 This report uses the terms “Houthis”, “Houthi fighters”, and “Houthi movement” to refer to the armed group and uses the term “Ansar Allah” to refer to the political leadership representing the Houthis which eventually has come to exercise de facto authority over parts of Yemen. See footnote 2 and Annex I for further details. 80 Thomas May Juneau, “Iran's policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest investment”, International Affairs, Vol. 92, Issue 3, May 2016, pp. 647–663. See also Bruce Riedel, ‘Who are the Houthis, and why are we at war with them?’, Brookings Institute, 18 December 2017. 81 Council on Foreign Relations, “Al –Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”, 19 June 2015. 74 24