A/HRC/14/24 73. On the other hand, experience shows a significant risk that such groups will commit serious human rights abuses with impunity, or evolve into unaccountable militias or bandit forces.32 This remains a problem in both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic.33 74. Given the prevalence of civil defence groups around the world, and their potential either to protect or to violate the right to life, further research is needed to study the conditions under which they come into existence, the factors that contribute to illegal conduct, and what Governments and the international community can do to mitigate such risks. It is clear that human rights law requires Governments to exercise due diligence in preventing such groups from committing abuses, and to investigate, prosecute and punish violations when they occur. But difficult questions include whether, in what circumstances, and how Governments could or should legally support or encourage the development of civil defence groups. F. Corruption and unlawful killings 75. Corruption has been a significant issue in most of the countries visited.34 Initial appearances notwithstanding, there is often a strong link between corruption and killings. Corruption can contribute to the commission of unlawful killings (e.g. violence by police against civilians who refuse to pay a bribe), to impunity for killings (through bribery of police, prosecutors or judges), and can divert essential resources from much needed Government programmes that would help to reduce killings. Thus, corruption can be both a cause and a consequence of killings and of impunity. 76. Pervasive and deep-rooted corruption is difficult to change, but in the absence of such change there is often little point in recommending sweeping reforms of police or legal systems. Research could explore the factors that contribute to or reduce killings in corrupt contexts and the effectiveness of measures to reduce corruption and their impact on killing levels. Such measures might include requiring audits of Government institutions, obligating senior officials to publicly declare their assets (A/HRC/14/24/Add.5); instituting zero tolerance policies (E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.4, para. 57); strengthening police oversight mechanisms (idem); instituting radical structural reforms (A/HRC/11/2/Add.6, para. 95), or tailoring witness protection programmes specifically to guard witnesses against police reprisals and widespread witness intimidation.35 77. Research could also examine the role and impact of donor assistance for anticorruption initiatives. While, for example, donor aid to improve salaries for police forces and the judiciary can be necessary and welcome, it is often only one part of the systemic reforms required to address corruption, violence and a culture of impunity (A/HRC/8/3/Add.3, paras. 90-91). Aid may be more effective when part of a coordinated system of donor-provided funding for rule of law programmes, defined broadly to include a variety of institutions and all levels of society, but the exact parameters, needs, and outcomes of such initiatives needs further study. 32 33 34 35 18 E/CN.4/1994/7, paras. 719-720 (referring to the Bangladesh Rifles and Ansar Guards in Bangladesh, civil self-defence patrols in Guatemala, rondas campesinas and comités de defensa civil in Peru, Citizen’s Armed Forces Geographical Units in the Philippines and the Kontrgerilla and Village Guards in Turkey). A/HRC/14/24/Add.3 and A/HRC/14/24/Add.5. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.4, paras. 39-41 and 48 (Nigeria); A/HRC/11/2/Add.6, para. 31 (Kenya); and A/HRC/11/2/Add.3, paras. 83-86. A/HRC/11/2/Add.2, para. 61 and A/HRC/11/2/Add.7, para. 38.