A/HRC/2/6 page 14 52. Freedom of expression is also protected in all three regional human rights instruments. The guarantee in the ECHR is very similar to that of the ICCPR, albeit with a slightly longer list of aims in service of which expression may be restricted. The guarantee in the ACHR is also structurally very similar, although it additionally contains a number of explicit protections for freedom of expression, such as a prohibition on prior censorship and on using indirect means to restrict expression.43 The guarantee in the ACHPR is rather weaker on its face, allowing simply for restrictions “within the law”, although subsequent interpretation of this by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has substantially narrowed the potential scope of this provision.44 53. International courts have made it clear that the test for restrictions on freedom of expression is a very strict one which imposes a high standard of justification on States.45 First, the restriction must be provided for by law. This implies not only that the restriction finds a basis in law but also that the law is accessible and “formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct”.46 The first part of the test – the requirement of being provided for by law – would apply to laws on incitement to genocide and hate speech in the same way as any laws restricting freedom of expression. In other words, such laws must be accessible and precise. 54. However, international courts have held that even a somewhat vague set of primary rules may be clarified by judicial interpretation.47 In Ross, the Human Rights Committee recognized the “vague criteria of the provisions” but held that they were nevertheless provided for by law, noting that the Supreme Court of Canada had considered all aspects of the case and found a sufficient basis for the original decision in Canadian law. 55. Furthermore, the interference must pursue one or more of the aims listed in article 19, paragraph 3, of ICCPR. This list of aims is exclusive and it is clear that restrictions on freedom of expression serving other aims are not legitimate. Third, the restriction must be necessary to protect those aims. “Necessary” implies that there is a “pressing social need” for the restriction, that the reasons given by the State to justify the restriction are “relevant and sufficient” and that the restriction is proportionate in the sense that the benefits outweigh the harm.48 It is under this part of the test that the vast majority of freedom of expression cases, including those involving hate speech, are decided. 56. As highlighted during the drafting of the ICCPR, there is a potential conflict between Article 19, paragraph 3, of the ICCPR which guarantees freedom of expression but permits restrictions on this freedom under specific conditions, and Article 20, paragraph 2, which imposes an obligation to restrict speech.49 The two articles were kept separate since they dealt with different objectives, however, it was decided that they should go next to each other to emphasize the close relationship between them.50 57. In Ross, the Human Rights Committee held that a restriction on the author’s freedom of expression aimed at protecting against racism had to be justified by reference to the test set out in Article 19, paragraph 3, of ICCPR.51 This reflects the natural conclusion that any law seeking to implement the provisions of article 20, paragraph 2, of ICCPR must not overstep the limits on restrictions on freedom of expression set out in article 19, paragraph 3. Conversely, article 19, paragraph 3, must be interpreted in a manner that respects the terms of article 20, paragraph 2.