A/HRC/35/22 I. Introduction 1. States increasingly rely on the digital access industry to control, restrict or monitor expression online. When authorities seek to disconnect users from websites, social media, or the Internet entirely, they frequently require the assistance of Internet service providers (ISPs). They interfere with the Internet exchange points (IXPs) that facilitate traffic into or within a country. They access private communications and other personal data held by telecommunications providers. Today, many of these actors are privately owned or operated. Under protest, in silent acquiescence or as willing participants, they are often essential to State censorship and surveillance. What governments demand of private actors, and how those actors respond, can cripple the exchange of information; limit journalists’ capacity to investigate securely; deter whistle-blowers and human rights defenders. Private actors may also restrict freedom of expression on their own initiative. They may assign priority to Internet content or applications in exchange for payment or other commercial benefits, altering how users engage with information online. Companies that offer filtering services may influence the scope of content accessible to their subscribers. 2. States and private actors both implicate the freedom of expression. State obligations to protect freedom of expression are clear, but what do private actors owe their users? How should they respect freedom of expression? What steps are they taking to assess and address the risks that their responses to government actions and policies might pose to freedom of expression and privacy? How much information should they share with their customers about State demands and requests? When they are directly involved or linked to abuse, what remedies should be available to individuals or the broader public whose interests are at risk? 3. The private actors that make digital access possible mediate and enable the exercise of freedom of expression. To be sure, States drive most censorship and surveillance. But just as States often, but not always, rely upon providers to take the actions that make censorship possible, we as users — beneficiaries of the remarkable advances of the digital age — deserve to understand how those actors interact with one another, how these interactions and their independent actions affect us and what responsibilities providers have to respect fundamental rights. 4. The present report is the result of over one year’s worth of study and consultation that began with the mapping in 2016 of the information and communications technology (ICT) sector (see A/HRC/32/38). 1 In response to a call for submissions, 2 the Special Rapporteur received 25 submissions from States; 3 from companies; 22 from civil society, academics and others; and 1 confidential submission. In addition, the Special Rapporteur convened a brainstorming session hosted by ARTICLE 19, in London in July 2016, a meeting of experts at the Human Rights Institute, University of Connecticut, United States of America, in October 2016, a regional consultation with the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in Guadalajara, Mexico, in December 2016, and a regional consultation in Beirut in February 2017.3 1 2 3 I want to thank Amos Toh, legal adviser to the mandate and Ford Foundation Fellow at University of California, Irvine, School of Law, for his expert research and analysis as well as coordination of substantial and essential research conducted by law students in University of California, Irvine, International Justice Clinic. See https://freedex.org/new-call-for-submissions-freedom-of-expression-and-thetelecommunications-and-internet-access-sector/. Submissions may be found on the website of the mandate. An overview of the consultations held and input received in the preparation of the present report may be found in a supplementary annex also available from the website of the mandate. 3