A/HRC/17/44 86. The Commission was told that when the demonstrations erupted, instructions were given to security forces to withdraw from police stations and security premises. 71 The Government has stressed that the live ammunition was only employed in response to demonstrators‟ violent actions. The Government also noted that demonstrators attacked police stations, destroying approximately 17 stations several of them in various cities and towns of Libya, and that demonstrators took up arms against the security forces. The Government was thus of the view that any use of force had been justifiable. 87. The majority of information collected by the Commission, however, indicates that the Government forces used live ammunition against unarmed peaceful demonstrators in many instances. While in some locations, in particular after 19 February, demonstrators increasingly took violent actions, the Commission concludes that the early days of the demonstration were peaceful. This conclusion is based upon information received from participants in the demonstration, but has also been corroborated by information collected from some security personnel. One member of security personnel, currently in detention, stated that he was among 250 soldiers deployed by the regime to “contain demonstrators” in Benghazi on 17 February. Interrogation records provided to the Commission by the Benghazi General Prosecutor‟s Office state that members of the security forces were given orders, by their commanding officers, to use force against demonstrators. In at least one transcript, there is an admission of involvement by a member of the security forces in the random shooting of protestors in Benghazi on 20 February. Similar information was provided in relation to the deliberate deployment of members of Kata’eb to violently disperse demonstrations in Al-Bayda. In one case a former security director who has since joined with opposition forces disclosed that he sought to gain approval for the redeployment of officers outside Al-Bayda from the highest levels of ISA and senior political figures. He did not receive authorization and was told to take instructions only from Khamis Qadhafi. The Benghazi Prosecutor‟s Office has also collected information relating to orders being given to fire at demonstrators on 17 February in Ras Lanuf and that security personnel had complied with said orders by utilizing anti-aircraft weaponry. 88. The Commission has not been able to determine if all participants in the demonstration were unarmed. However, from the information it has received, together with the videos and photos it has examined, it considers it likely that in the early days of the protest, the protestors were engaged in peaceful assemblies. 4. Conclusions 89. The Commission considers that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Government forces engaged in excessive use of force against demonstrators, at least in the early days of the protests, leading to significant deaths and injuries. The nature of injuries inflicted in several locations (with a high proportion of those wounded or killed shot in the head or upper body) is indicative of “shoot-to-kill” operations. From the common style of response by the forces in many parts of the country, it would appear likely that the forces were given orders to engage in the harsh crackdown of demonstrators. Such actions represented a serious breach of a range of rights under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights including the right to life, the right to security of person, as well as freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. In relation to the latter days of protests as the situation escalated, more investigation would be required to assess the security forces‟ use of force, 71 “The Great Socialist People‟s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Response to Accusations Relating to Human Rights Violations” report submitted to the Commission by Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 16 May 2011 in Geneva. This was confirmed in discussions with representatives of NTC. The Government ascribed this action to a desire to minimize civilian casualties, a position with which NTC did not agree. 27