A/HRC/43/18 practices, as well as in domestic legislation, policy and practice 47. The notion of male superiority is ingrained in Burmese society that deems men to have innate qualities unattainable by women (the concept of Hpon), as well as among many of the minority groups, perpetuating patriarchal attitudes and discriminatory gender stereotypes that continue to shape familial relationships, the gendered division of labour and underrepresentation of women in political decision-making. This situation has created a culture of social acceptance of gender-based violence against women and girls48. Moreover, the gendered impact of the conflict also further negatively affected enjoyment of a whole spectrum of human rights by women and girls including basic economic and social rights, and conflict and developmentinduced displacement have been a significant cause of feminization of poverty, migration and trafficking of ethnic minority women.49 24. Sexual and gender-based violence has been used as a tool in the context of ethnic conflicts, primarily as a means of destroying the social fabric of non-Burman communities. The systematic use by the military of sexual and gender-based violence (including gang rape, sexual slavery and sexual torture) and the impunity for such acts, has been extensively documented by women’s organizations over decades as “part of a deliberate strategy to intimidate, terrorize or punish a civilian population, and […] a tactic of war” 50. Testimony recorded, including most recently by the Fact-Finding Mission, highlights how brutal sexual violence against women and girls, as well as men, boys and transgender persons, aimed at destroying those targeted (physically and spiritually) as well as their communities. For many years, Rohingya women were denied reproductive and sexual rights, restricted to a strict twochild policy and subject to sanctions under the Penal Code51. g. Contemporary drivers of discrimination 25. While the factors described in previous sections can be identified as root causes of the widespread and serious violations of the rights of minorities in Myanmar, these alone do not explain the recent intensification of violence in Rakhine State and the persecution of Muslims, in particular of the Rohingya. A number of contemporary factors must be considered. 26. Although there were episodes of anti-Muslim violence in the past, the ongoing wave of Islamophobia in Myanmar has been fuelled by a burgeoning Buddhist ultra-nationalism that has drawn significant support from the majority population since 2012. The role of the “969 movement” and MaBaTha (the Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion) in fuelling anti-Muslim bias and rumours and creating fear and hatred among the Buddhist population has been particularly prominent. 27. These movements have been spearheaded by ultra-nationalist monks who have disseminated negative stereotypes and prejudices against Islam and Muslims as posing an existential threat to Burman race and Buddhist religion in Myanmar. They have used international narratives on the global “war on terror” and alleged examples of “Islamization” in other countries to reinforce fearmongering. The Rohingya have been targeted, in racist terms, as “Bengali” immigrants living illegally in Myanmar, and in Islamophobic terms, as a source of violent Islamic extremism. While traditional mediums such as sermons and pamphlets have been influential, Facebook and other social media have had a significant multiplier effect in spreading hate. 47 See CEDAW/C/MMR/CO/4-5. In 2014, the Gender Equality Network, a coalition of over hundred civil society organizations, found that almost half of the women surveyed had experienced either non-partner rape, sexual assault, or sexual harassment. 49 Kachin Women’s Association “Instability in Burma fuelling trafficking of Kachin women to China”. 50 A/HRC/39/64, para. 39. 51 Human Rights Watch, “Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women regarding Myanmar’s exceptional report on the situation of women and girls from northern Rakhine State”, May 2018, p. 7. 48 9