A/HRC/6/21 page 8 (as opposed to the functions) of treaty monitoring bodies had been by way of amending the parent treaty, rather than by means of an optional protocol (e.g. the increase in the size of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, changes in relation to meeting times of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and the granting of emoluments to members of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee against Torture), whereas the conferral of additional functions to treaty bodies were being affected by means of optional protocols. 25. The Government of Liechtenstein noted the link between the process of changing the legal status of CESCR and the ongoing discussions on treaty body reform. 26. The Government of Mauritius noted that in order to change the legal status of the Committee, consideration may be given to making the required amendments to the ICESCR in light of the present report. 27. The Government of Mexico considered that the appropriate process of modifying the legal status of the CESCR would be through an amendment to the Covenant, to be approved by a conference of States parties, in conformity with the procedure set out in article 29. The wording of such an amendment should be similar to that of the provisions of the other human rights treaties establishing their respective treaty monitoring body. Mexico noted that there would be a transition period until all States parties had ratified the amendment to the Covenant, and it would be necessary to ensure that this did not negatively affect the continuity of the functions and work of the CESCR. It concurred with the observation of the Committee made in its letter of 18 May 2007 to the President of the Human Rights Council, that it had not been hindered in its functions owing to its status as a subsidiary body of ECOSOC, and also concurred with the Committee as to the importance of ensuring that the process of modifying its legal status would not hinder the ongoing work to elaborate an optional protocol to the Covenant carried out by an open-ended working group of the Human Rights Council. In view of the above, Mexico proposed a double procedure: on the one hand, to proceed with an amendment to Part IV of the Covenant following the procedure set out in its article 29, and on the other, to include a clause in the draft optional protocol which would require States to ratify the amendment to Part IV of the Covenant in order to become parties to the optional protocol. In this way, States parties to the optional protocol would be required to submit their periodic reports to the CESCR under its modified treaty-based legal status. 28. The Government of the Philippines indicated that to rectify the legal status of the CESCR and place it on a par with the other treaty monitoring bodies, States parties would have to amend the Covenant to provide for the establishment of a treaty monitoring body in accordance with article 29. 29. The Government of Turkey noted that, as mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General (E/1996/101), granting the CESCR a treaty-based status could be done either by amending the Covenant or by adopting an additional protocol to the Covenant. Article 29 of the Covenant and article 40 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties established the procedure to be followed. The process of amending human rights treaties presented significant difficulties; experience had shown that such processes may be delayed indefinitely and may also pave the way for the renegotiation of a treaty. Bearing in mind these challenges, Turkey considered that adopting an additional protocol appeared to be a more preferable option to grant the Committee a