A/HRC/3/2 page 52 210. The Commission was informed by the Director of the Jiyyeh power plant that the compound had been subject to two different attacks. The first strike took place on 13 July and was directed at one storage tank with a capacity of 10,000 tons of oil. Oil flowed from the tank but was held by the external retainer wall of the power plant building, which was some 4 metres high. Firefighters were able to put out the fire that ensued. The second attack, on 15 July, was directed at another storage tank, with a capacity of 15,000 tons of oil. The explosion and subsequent fire caused the explosion of another tank, with a capacity of 25,000 tons. The explosion and the very high temperature caused by the fire destroyed the retaining wall, thus leading to the massive flow of oil into the sea.189 211. The Commission is convinced that the attack was premeditated and was not a target of opportunity. Indeed, the strike was directly aimed at those tanks that had been filled in the days preceding the attacks. No missile was directed at empty tanks, nor at the main generator and machinery, which are just a few meters away from the storage tanks. 212. The spill affected two thirds of Lebanon’s coastline. Beaches and rocks were covered in a black sludge up to Byblos, north of Beirut and extended into the southern parts of Syria. According to the Lebanon Marine and Coastal Oil Pollution International Assistance Action Plan prepared by the Expert Working Group for Lebanon,190 winds and surface sea currents caused the oil slick to move north, some 150 km from the source in a matter of a few days. This rapid movement of the slick caused significant damages on the Lebanese coastline, as well as the Syrian coast. Furthermore, due to the air blockade no air surveillance and assessment actions were possible. The only possibility left was to use satellite remote-sensing images. While cleaning up measures were undertaken a few days before the end of the conflict, under the authority of the Lebanese Ministry of Environment and the Lebanese Army, weeks after the ceasefire there were reports of oil slicks still floating in different areas.191 213. The Commission found that the environmental damage caused by the intensive Israeli bombing goes beyond the Jiyyeh oil spill. Damaged power transformers, collapsed buildings, attacks on fuel stations, and the destruction of chemical plants and other industries may have leaked or discharged hazardous substances and materials to the ground, such as asbestos and chlorinated compounds. These hazardous materials may gravely affect underground and surface water supplies, as well as the health and fertility of arable land. 214. Similarly, the large destruction of buildings and other civilian infrastructure may pose a threat to public health in view of the massive amount of debris that needs to be disposed of. In this respect, the UNEP Environmental Update of 24 August indicates, for example, that in the southern suburb of Haret Hreik the destruction of buildings in an area of about 200 by 240 meters generated approximately 1 million cubic metres of rubble, which amounts to the total waste that the whole Lebanese population generates in one year. 215. Furthermore, the Commission has also considered that direct attacks on fuel storage tanks and petrol stations, as well as on factories such as the Maliban glass factory, the Sai El-Deen plastics facility and the Liban Lait dairy plant, among others, have created increased risks of pollution by chemical agents that may have contaminated water sources, arable land and the air, posing a direct threat to the health of the Lebanese population.