A/HRC/28/74 consensual process of socialization, and sometimes, ostracization. 55 Rarely is a State punished for its human rights violations in the way that violations are sanctioned in the domestic legal system.56 54. Although the choice between a Charter-based or treaty-based mechanism is not clear-cut when considering accountability for unilateral coercive measures that have an adverse impact on the enjoyment of human rights, the universal periodic review may be better suited to ensuring accountability at the global level since it targets each and every State Member of the United Nations throughout each four-year cycle. C. Access to independent evidence 55. Another important consideration when selecting the best-suited mechanisms for the assessment and/or mitigation of the adverse effects of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights is the extent to which that body would have access to robust or direct independent evidence. The special procedures of the Human Rights Council do in fact enjoy such an advantage over other mechanisms, since they are often able to undertake on-site visits to the relevant States and territories. D. Consideration of financial and administrative efficiency 56. The United Nations system is currently striving to be as financially and administratively efficient and cost-effective as possible without significantly cutting down its relevant programmes. This consideration suggests that a multiplicity of mechanisms to take on the task of assessing and promoting accountability for the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures should be avoided. A single Charter-based or treaty-based body ought therefore to be considered the mechanism of choice for the task at hand. E. Need to secure the most appropriate expertise 57. Given the fact that unilateral coercive measures of a comprehensive nature are more likely to have an adverse impact on the enjoyment of economic and social rights, especially in relation to women, children and other vulnerable groups in targeted States (also emphasized by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 24/14), the mechanism of choice may need to be a body or a person with the requisite expertise in the area of economic and social rights. In the context of treaty-based bodies, this would point to three specific bodies that could perform the task jointly, namely, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the Child. Financial and administrative considerations might, however, militate against this more cumbersome route, where multiple mechanisms would be involved in looking at the adverse impact of unilateral coercive measures on human rights. This would once again suggest a Charter-based option, such as the appointment of a special procedure by the Human Rights Council. The selection process of the appropriate mandate holder would moreover provide the Council with more flexibility when identifying the person it considers best suited for the position, with adequate expertise in the areas identified. 55 56 16 Ibid. See also Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, “How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law”, Duke Law Journal, vol. 54, 2004, p. 7. Ibid.