A/HRC/28/74 F. Minimizing politicization 58. The issue of the imposition of unilateral coercive measures is directly tied to global politics and the challenge that is posed to the multilateral ideal by the actions of many States.57 For the mechanism eventually selected to perform the task to gain the most popular legitimacy and effectiveness, preference should be given to one that has the potential to minimize the politicization of the issue. With a few exceptions, both treaty-based and Charter-based bodies are designed to be as non-political as possible and therefore do not enjoy any specific advantage in this respect. VII. Concluding remarks and recommended actions 59. The fact that unilateral coercive measures are likely to have a negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights by the civilian population of targeted and, in some cases, non-targeted States does not seem to be a matter of controversy. However, assessing the impact of unilateral coercive measures on the human rights of the civilian population, and more particularly, on vulnerable groups, such as women and children, would require on-site visits to the States affected by such measures to verify, in an independent manner, the actual effects of such measures on the different segments of the population. 60. One obvious conclusion of the discussions above is that this function should squarely rest on one of the relevant human rights mechanisms, namely, either a treaty-based or a Charter-based mechanism. The challenge faced by treaty-based bodies in discharging this function is the narrow territorial and jurisdictional manner in which the obligations of States are framed in the relevant treaties. For this reason, Charter-based bodies, which tend to have a more flexible mandate, are to be preferred for the task. 61. Almost all of the factors considered for selecting the most appropriate mechanism for the assessment of the adverse effect of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights seem to lead to the conclusion that a special procedure should be established to undertake the task. The need for the selected mechanism to have as much direct access as possible to robust and independent evidence, to align with the United Nations administrative and financial efficiency goals, and to have a great degree of flexibility to select and deploy the most appropriate technical expertise in the area would indeed tend to point to the creation of a special procedures mandate by the Human Rights Council. 62. Almost all of the stakeholders who responded to the questionnaire were also of the view that the most appropriate mechanism for assessing the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights should be a special procedure mandate, although some stated that the establishment of a world court on human rights might be more appropriate. The European Union did not consider the Human Rights Council to be the appropriate forum for addressing the issue. 63. With regard to the promotion of accountability for the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, the most appropriate 57 See Christine Chinkin, “The State that acts alone: bully, good Samaritan or iconoclast?”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 11, No. 1 (2000), p. 31; and Alberto R. Coll, “Harming human rights in the name of promoting them: the case of the Cuban embargo”, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, vol. 12, No. 2 (2007), p. 199. 17