A/HRC/30/42 which the 2005 Constitution set in place, and on which peace in Burundi still hinges. 38 64. Truth commissions and peace agreements have advocated for introducing mechanisms of inclusion into constitutional texts. The Guatemalan Peace Accord, for example, emphasized the need to define the country as multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multilingual at the constitutional level. The Guatemalan C ommission on Historical Clarification elaborated recommendations on inclusion and the protection of indigenous rights, calling for modes of governance that enable individual and collective rights of the indigenous population and encourage their socia l and political participation. 2. Incorporating a bill of rights 65. A good part of the effectiveness of bills of rights depends on the strength of the courts that interpret them and on how deeply other State powers feel bound by courts’ decisions. However, introducing a bill of rights that publically enumerates the most fundamental rights a country seeks to safeguard is a powerful way of drawing a line between an abusive past and a different future, especially in the aftermath of mass violations. The design of a bill of rights and enshrining the basic principles of governance signals to institutions and individuals where minimum standards of acceptable behaviour lie. Bills of rights are a sort of a “pre-commitment” strategy that works on the basis of publicity and takes some issues out of the give -and-take of political expediency. 39 66. In many countries with past mass violations, minorities were predominantly targeted. Articulating clear and enforceable guarantees for minorities in bills of rights may offer some protection and de-incentivize both attacks on them and the taking by them of preemptive action in ways that are characteristic of “security dilemmas”. 67. Where Governments have a history of committing or condoning human rights violations, a bill of rights enables courts to identify legislation and governmental practices that have the potential to lead to recurrence of violations before they take place. 3. Security sector reform 68. Crucial elements in the area of security sector reform aiming at the prevention of violations in the future pertain to: (a) defining the different roles of the police, the military and the intelligence services; (b) strengthening civilian control over the armed forces; (c) the elimination of military “prerogatives”; and (d) the vetting of the security forces. In the light of the complexity of these areas, the Special Rapporteur has dedicated a separate report to these reform undertakings. 40 4. Separation of powers 69. Abuses of power by security forces and lack of judicial independence are often manifestations of the same phenomenon, namely, a bloated and unrestrained executive power uninterested in accountability. Following mass violations, some 38 39 40 16 See A/HRC/30/42/Add.1. See Stephen Holmes, “Precommitment and the paradox of democracy”, in Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Report to be presented to the General Assembly at its seventieth session.