A/HRC/45/32 questions about what happened to those payments and, if they were not made, why the State did not seek to enforce the terms of those contracts, that were supposed to benefit its people. 72. Lastly, despite the fact that since 2016, the $800 monthly pay of Burundian military personnel deployed in the African Union Mission in Somalia has been transferred directly by the African Union into their personal bank accounts in order to avoid any misappropriation, the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that the Government of Burundi has continued to systematically tap into part of the pay using surreptitious means. 73. Most of the country’s technical and financial partners are aware of the risk of diversion of funds. They have taken steps to minimize the risk by ceasing to contribute directly to the State budget, instead supporting operational partners such as non-governmental organizations, or directly paying the beneficiaries of their assistance. However, the measures that are taken are not always sufficient. 3. Conflicts of interest and the illegal protection of interests 74. On the basis of publicly available information, the Commission has noted numerous cases of conflict of interest to which the authorities have turned a blind eye, even though, without being an offence in itself, such a situation is conducive to corruption, favouritism and the illegal protection of interests, which for their part are offences under Burundian law. 75. For example, despite the fact that article 142 of the Constitution prohibits ministers from engaging in any other activities, one of President Nkurunziza’s ministers has retained his position as director of a civil engineering company that may do work in areas falling within his competence as a minister. Also, a senior government official has his own communications company, which has been awarded government contracts in the area directly under his responsibility. Several senior officials or assistants to ministers have been appointed to the boards of companies operating in fields covered by their ministerial portfolios. 76. The Commission has also received credible allegations that several persons holding high political or administrative positions, including within the CNDD-FDD party, own significant shares in companies holding veritable monopolies, either in law or in practice, for the marketing of certain products or services in the country. 4. Government contracts 77. Government contracts are awarded in Burundi with very little transparency and much abuse of privately agreed-upon terms that often benefit those close to the people in power, which facilitates corruption and misappropriation of public funds. In 2017, government contracts accounted for more than 215 billion Burundian francs (or over $111 million) – or more than a quarter of the current expenditure of the State’s estimated annual budget – including 18 billion francs (or about $9 million) in privately negotiated agreements. 28 Practices such as overcharging and under-delivery of services are common. For example, some goods such as vehicles have been purchased at two to three times their current market value, and roads have very quickly fallen into disrepair after being built. 5. Customs fraud 78. Several products, including minerals such as gold, but also coffee and oil, are exported or imported without being officially declared, for example by means of the corruption of certain authorities, thus depriving the State of substantial tax revenues. Despite the fact that the publicly available information on the country’s international trade is fragmentary, the Commission had noted significant inconsistencies which are a matter of concern. Of course, such discrepancies can be explained in part by reporting or accounting errors, differences in the calculation of market values and the application of different exchange rates. However, given their magnitude, such differences raise the possibility of large-scale customs fraud and shed light on the general lack of transparency in this area. 28 14 See www.armp.bi/files/Rapports/Rapports%20Annuels/ARMP_RAPPORT_ANNUEL_2017_ Version_du_20_avril_2018_pdf.pdf. GE.20-10689