A/HRC/45/32 6. Graft 79. The Commission has obtained evidence that several persons holding high political or administrative positions, including within the CNDD-FDD party, have real estate holdings and/or assets in foreign countries, sometimes under a front name, and that they or members of their entourage hold directors’ positions in several companies based abroad, including in South Africa, Kenya and Belgium. In addition, the assets of several Burundian officials, particularly in real estate, appear to be completely out of proportion with their official remuneration. 80. In view of the corruption in the Burundian economy and allegations of the payment of large sums of money to those same persons in order to obtain operating licences, particularly in the mining sector, the Commission has reasonable grounds to believe that those officials have enriched themselves illegally. It is worth noting that Burundian elected officials do not systematically declare their assets to the Supreme Court at the beginning and end of their terms of office, as required, however, by articles 95 and 159 of the Constitution. E. Responsibilities 1. Responsibility of the Burundian State 81. Once again, the Commission has found that the Burundian State can be held responsible for the acts constituting human rights violations documented in this report. 29 82. The actions of agents of the State, particularly officers of the National Intelligence Service and the police, but also of the administrative authorities that represent the State in the provinces, municipalities, districts and hill districts, are directly attributable to the Burundian State, in conformity with its obligation to respect human rights and ensure that its agents refrain from violating them. 83. The Imbonerakure often act alone or sometimes in the presence of representatives of the police, the National Intelligence Service or local authorities. They enjoy considerable latitude in carrying out their activities, conferred on them by the Burundian authorities who have the means to control them, as well as almost total impunity. Imbonerakure are still regularly – indeed, almost routinely – used to supplement or replace the security forces, particularly in rural areas, at the request or with the consent of members, including senior officials, of the National Intelligence Service, the police, the Office of the President and local authorities. Some have military material and equipment reserved in principle for the defence and security forces, such as elements of military uniforms and boots, which attests to their central role within the formal and informal security structures of the Burundian State. When the conduct of the Imbonerakure is acknowledged and adopted by agents of the State, when they act on the instructions of such agents or when they act in “complete dependence” on or under the “effective control” of such agents, the Burundian State is directly responsible for their actions. 84. In the rare cases in which the Imbonerakure reportedly acted outside these scenarios, the nearly general impunity they enjoy following their acts also means that the responsibility of the Burundian State is engaged, in conformity with its obligation to protect human rights. Indeed, the State must, when it is aware or should have been aware of violations or abuses committed by third parties, undertake effective investigations and prosecutions, which has not generally been the case. 2. Responsibility of armed groups 85. Because the Commission has not had access to victims and the Government has repeatedly refused to pass on information, the Commission has been unable to corroborate the information it has received on the involvement of armed groups in human rights violations, in particular in relation to security incidents involving them. 29 GE.20-10689 See A/HRC/36/54 and Corr.1, A/HRC/39/63 and A/HRC/42/49. 15