A/HRC/32/48 Presidential decrees may overrule existing legislation on any issue, including constitutional law. 20. The presidential administration also overrides the principle of the separation of powers by determining the policies of the executive, preparing draft legislation adopted by Parliament and influencing the courts by providing conceptual instructions concerning State policy (“directives”). The legal framework in place does not allow for change unless it is based on the political will of the President. As a result, basic civil and political rights, like economic, cultural and social rights, whether or not included in the Constitution or in international treaties, are not enforceable by the citizens, even though the Government may refer to them rights when executing the State’s policies. 21. The Special Rapporteur remains concerned by the system of appointment of judges and prosecutors, as described in his previous report to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/29/43, paras. 34-40). The President may single-handedly promote or demote any judge or prosecutor. The absence of any separation between the judiciary and the executive power was already underlined in the report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review in 2010 (A/HRC/15/16 98.25), and again in 2015 (A/HRC/30/3, para. 127.74-75). In 2012, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights urged Belarus to guarantee the full independence and impartiality of the judiciary in line with the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, including by establishing an independent body responsible for the appointment, promotion, suspension and removal of judges (E/C.12/BLR/CO/4-6, para. 6). To the knowledge of the Special Rapporteur, such a body had not yet been established (as at 31 March 2016). 22. Defence lawyers, despite numerous recommendations by United Nations mechanisms, continue to be fully dependent on the Ministry of Justice, which controls entry to the legal profession. Arbitrary, politicized claims of violations of rules, such as cooperation with United Nations human rights mechanisms, can lead to disciplinary removal from the bar association at any time and without recourse to appeal. 23. The Special Rapporteur reiterates his calls for the engagement of the Government of Belarus in a broad reform to bring legislation into compliance with its international human rights obligations. He recommends that the Government, inter alia, repeal article No. 193.1 of the Criminal Code, which criminalizes membership in unauthorized associations and public events, reform its oppressive media governance, in consultation with all media and civil society actors, and establish a legal moratorium on capital punishment with a view to its abolishment. III. Engagement with the international human rights system 24. The Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review examined Belarus on 4 May 2015, for the second time. The compilation prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (A/HRC/WG.6/22/BLR/2) contained information on the level of engagement of the authorities with the United Nations human rights system as at 4 March 2015. Since that date, the Special Rapporteur has noted no further engagement. The authorities refused to support recommendations to extend a standing invitation to special procedure mandate holders (A/HRC/30/3, paras. 130.25 – 130.38). 25. The Special Rapporteur notes that the Government of Belarus examined and supported recommendations made by the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review on considering or facilitating ratification of or accession to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (A/HRC/30/3, paras. 127.2 – 127.5) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (A/HRC/30/3, paras. 127.7 – 127.11). The Special Rapporteur points out, 6